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One Year After Dondi: Time
to Get Back to Litigating?
William A. Brewer III and Francis B. Majorie*
In the immediately preceding issue, the Pepperdine Law Review proudly
published an article by The Honorable Thomas M, Reavley, Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circui entitled Rambo Litigators: Pit-
ting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics. See 17 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 637
(1990). The Review is now honored to offer a view of the propriety of aggres-
sive litigation tactics by presenting the following article, which is offered in
response to Judge Reavley's. With the publication of these two articles, as well
as Judge Reavley's brief response which follows, the Pepperdine Law Review
hopes to contribute to the ongoing process of discovering the dimensions of ef-
fective advocacy and representation within ethical limitations. The Review
expresses its appreciation to William Brewer III and Francis Majorie, as well
as to Judge Reavley, for their contributions to this effort
-Eds.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, bar associations between California and New York,
as well as those from Oregon to Texas, have either adopted or pro-
posed codes of "courtesy" and "civility" which tell litigators how they
should behave in their offices, their conference rooms, and the court-
room.1 Galvanized by the plethora of articles decrying "hardball" lit-
igation tactics and the "Rambo" litigators who employ them,2 the
* Mr. Brewer is admitted to practice in the states of New York and Texas and
several federal courts, including the Northern District of Texas and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Mr. Majorie is admitted to practice in the
states of New York and Connecticut and several federal courts, including the Northern
District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit. Mr. Brewer is a partner in the Dallas office of
the national litigation firm of Bickel and Brewer. Mr. Majorie is a partner in the firm
of Majorie and Associates.
1. For example, the Dallas Bar Association adopted Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy and a Lawyer's Creed, and the American College of Trial Lawyers adopted a
Code of Trial Conduct. Other bar associations have adopted similar codes of "civility"
or "courtesy." See, e.g., BEVERLY HILLS BAR Ass'N, A LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSION-
ALISM; COLORADO BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM; L.A.
COUNTY BAR ASS'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES (proposed April 28, 1989) [hereinafter LOS
ANGELES GUIDELINES]; LOUISVILLE BAR ASS'N, CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM.
2. See, e.g., Baird, Bedside Manners and Desktop Distractions, 13 LITIGATION 33
"courtesy codes" emanate from a perception that the bar has become
less personalized and more hostile, that the courts have become
overburdened by a flood of litigation, and that the cost of resolving
disputes is beyond the reach of many members of our society.3 We
are told that the cause of these "ills" is the zealous advocate who for-
gets that the duty owed to a client is somehow circumscribed by a
"broader" duty to society as a whole. 4
To many, the significance of the courtesy codes was heightened on
July 14, 1988, when an en banc panel of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas jointly decided Dondi
Properties Corporation v. Commerce Savings & Loan Association5
and an otherwise unrelated case, Knight v. Protective Life Insurance
Company.6 The Dondi Properties case arose out of a plaintiff's al-
leged failure to answer interrogatories, failure to comply with court
orders concerning discovery, misrepresentation of facts to the court,
and withholding of documents.7 Similarly, the Knight case involved
a plaintiff's refusal to consent to the filing of a reply brief after it
had been filed in violation of local rules.8
Both cases, now known collectively as the Dondi opinion, stand for
much more than their procedural histories imply. Each was used by
the Northern District to establish sua sponte "standards of litigation
conduct to be observed in civil actions litigated in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas." 9 Because each can be found in the Federal Rules De-
cisions, Dondi has thrust the power of the United States into a
debate which has important connotations for the continued strength
of our system of law.1O
This article examines the assumptions and conclusions of Dondi
(Winter 1987); Brown, Narcissism, Manners, and Moral&- Can Grace and Collegiality
be Salvaged? 13 LITIGATION 17 (Winter 1987); Committee on Federal Courts, A Pro-
posed Code of Litigation Conduct, 43 REC. A. B. N.Y. 738 (1988) [hereinafter New York
Code]; Goldberg, Playing Hardball, A.B.A. J., July 1987, at 48; Penegar, The Five Pil-
lars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 307 (1988); Policzer, Some Guidelines for
Zealous Representation, 13 LITIGATION 43 (Winter 1987); Sayler, Rambo Litigation,
Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 79; Solovy & Byman,
Hardball Discovery, 15 LITIGATION 8 (Fall, 1988); Miner, Lawyers Owe One Another,
Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 13; see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) (reversing the
six-month suspension of a lawyer from practice before the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals on the ground that a single incident of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy
does not support a finding of contemptuous conduct, a finding that the lawyer is not
presently fit to practice law in the federal courts, or suspension for "conduct unbecom-
ing a member of the bar").
3. See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text.
4. Id
5. 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
9. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286.
10. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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and related commentaries. Section II describes the cases giving rise
to the opinion in Dondi and suggests that Dondi's adoption of a cour-
tesy code was premised upon four unsubstantiated assumptions: the
bar has become less civil and professional in the recent past; liti-
gators' decreased civility and increased commercialism cause needless
delays in the litigation of cases; lawyers' assumed lack of courtesy
and growing "law as a business" perspective have unduly increased
the costs of resolving disputes; and lawyers' hardball tactics are re-
sponsible for the profession's low esteem in society." Section III
then examines each of these assumptions and concludes that they are
without empirical verification and, in all likelihood, false.12
Section IV of the article assumes, arguendo, that hardball tactics
are responsible for the ills identified in Dondi, and examines
whether those abuses will be eradicated by Dondi-like decisions or
codes of conduct.13 Section V in turn discusses the harms that might
be caused by the adoption of courtesy codes as authoritative rules of
professional behavior.14 The article concludes that the codes divert
attention from the real causes of delayed dockets, costly litigation,
and negative public perspectives about our profession.15 The article
also concludes that the codes may exacerbate the ills which they in-
tend to allay by confusing the role of the advocate with opposing
counsel, the judge, and the jury.'6 In the end, the effects of Dondi
and codes of courtesy may sacrifice clients' rights, chill social and
legal change, and irreparably undermine our system of laws.
II. THE DONDI OPINION: AN EXERCISE IN JUDICIAL LEGISLATION?
The Dondi opinion was rendered on July 14, 1988, by an en banc
panel of the eleven judges sitting in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.17 The panel was convened at the
request of a single, unidentified judge' 8 in what the court itself con-
ceded was an "unusual" procedure.19 The two motions at issue in
Dondi arose out of serious allegations of wrongdoing in discovery
11. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
13. See inrfra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
14. See inrfra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
15. See id
16. See id
17. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 284-85
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).
18. Id at 286.
19. Id at 286 n.3.
(the Dondi Properties case)20 and the allegation that a plaintiff im-
properly refused to consent to the filing of a reply brief (the Knight
case).21 Curiously, those motions were not resolved by the panel, but
were left instead to the individual judge and magistrate before whom
they originally were pending.22 Both cases, however, were utilized by
the panel as vehicles to promulgate a code of conduct designed to
"end" what the court called "patterns of behavior that forebode ill
for our system of justice."23
A. What Dondi Meant to the Litigants
Dondi Properties arose out of the multi-million dollar failure of
Vernon Savings and Loan Association and contained claims under
RICO, the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, federal regulations
prohibiting affiliate transactions, and common-law claims for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, usury, and civil conspiracy.24 Knight
arose out of an alleged refusal to pay the plaintiff the proceeds of a
life insurance policy and violations of the Texas Insurance Code, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the common law.25 The
parties in both cases were represented by counsel from some of the
largest and best-known law firms in Dallas.26
1. The Holdings in Dondi Properties
Dondi Properties involved several motions for sanctions seeking
dismissal of the plaintiffs' case. The motions were based upon two
arguments: the plaintiffs had not complied with the court's orders re-
garding discovery; and the plaintiffs' counsel had improperly con-
tacted the representative of an opposing party without first
identifying himself as the plaintiffs' lawyer.27 The motions were
resolved by Magistrate Sanderson, to whom they originally had been
20. See id. at 289-91; iifra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
21. See Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 291-92; infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
22. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286 n.4.
23. Id at 286.
24. 1d. at 285.
25. Id
26. The plaintiff in Dondi Properties, for example, was represented by Dallas and
Washington, D.C. lawyers from Arter, Hadden & Witts, a law firm which listed 26 Dal-
las lawyers in the 1988 edition of Martindale-Hubbell. Id, at 284-85; VI MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY 2236B (1988) [hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBEL]. The de-
fendants in Dondi Properties were in turn represented by Figari & Davenport; Jack-
son, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller; Davis, Meadows, Owens, Collier & Zachry;
Weil & Renneker P.C.; and Randall L. Freedman. Each of these firms respectively
listed 12, 107, 19, and 3 attorneys in 1988. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 284-85; MARTINDALE-
HUBBELL, supra, at 2308B, 2359B, 2293B, 2513B. Similarly, the plaintiff in Knight was
represented by Figari & Davenport, and the defendants were represented by Thomp-
son & Knight, a firm which then had 179 lawyers. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 284-85; MAR-
TINDALE-HUBBELL, supra, at 2489B.
27. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 290.
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referred.28 Magistrate Sanderson denied the motions in all
respects. 29
a. The Alleged Violations of the Court's Discovery Orders
First, Magistrate Sanderson found that there was "no showing of
intentional or willful conduct on the part of plaintiffs or their coun-
sel" with respect to the alleged violations of the court's discovery or-
ders.30  The Magistrate also chastised the defendants for
characterizing the plaintiffs' conduct as being in bad faith and in defi-
ance of the court's prior orders.31 Specifically, Magistrate Sanderson
stated that the defendants' accusations added "much heat but little
light to the court's task of deciding discovery disputes."3 2
Magistrate Sanderson also noted that the parties' disputes revealed
"an inadequate utilization" of the pre-motion conference requirement
imposed by the court's local rules.3 3 In the Magistrate's view, pre-
motion conferences serve the useful purpose of resolving disputes
without court intervention or at least of ensuring that disputes will
be narrowed and focused before resolution by motion.3 4 In denying
the motions, Magistrate Sanderson noted that discovery controversies
"may well be resolved, or appreciably narrowed, following further
communications among counsel."35
b. The Alleged Improper Contact With a Party Witness
Magistrate Sanderson also denied the defendants' motion for sanc-
tions against plaintiffs' counsel.36 He noted that the defendants did
not seek to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel and did not show that they
had been prejudiced by the lawyers' communication with the wit-
ness.37 Magistrate Sanderson also noted that, while the client bears
the cost of a motion for sanctions in the litigation, the attorney him-
28. Id at 289-91.
29. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
30. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 289.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id The Local Rules provide, in pertinent part: "Before filing a motion, coun-
sel for a moving party shall confer with the counsel of all parties affected by the re-
quested relief to determine whether or not the contemplated motion will be opposed."
N.D. TEx. R. 5.1.
34. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 289.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Id at 290-91.
37. Id at 290.
self bears the cost of defending a grievance procedure.3 8 Thus, the
motion for sanctions was denied without prejudice to its renewal
before a grievance committee. 39 He also ordered that neither defend-
ants' nor plaintiffs' counsel could "charge their clients for any time
or expenses incurred" relating to the motion for sanctions.40
2. The Holding in Knight
Knight involved a motion to strike a reply brief which the defend-
ant filed without leave of court in violation of the court's local
rules.41 The motion was ruled upon by Judge Fitzwater of the Dis-
trict Court.42 The Judge began his analysis by noting that the "stan-
dards adopted by the court attempt to satisfy the goals of reducing
litigation costs and expediting the resolution of civil actions."43
Judge Fitzwater also specifically noted that the defendant "clearly vi-
olated a Local Rule" by filing the reply without permission and that
"the determination of whether to permit a reply is discretionary with
each judge."44 Nonetheless, Judge Fitzwater denied the plaintiffs'
motion to strike.45
Like the holding in Dondi Properties, the holding in Knight cannot
be explained by a principled discussion of the conduct of counsel. Ac-
cording to Judge Fitzwater, counsel for both parties had acted unrea-
sonably: defendants' counsel "failed to cooperate because he did not
ask him to agree to the filing of a reply";46 and plaintiffs' counsel
"did not cooperate in connection with the filing of the reply brief,"
thereby causing increased legal fees and an unnecessary expenditure
of judicial time.47 Curiously, Judge Fitzwater did not enforce the
conference requirement heralded in Magistrate Sanderson's earlier
decision in Dondi Properties by striking the improper, unconferenced
reply. Rather, he concluded that it is a "well-established principle"
that the "party with the burden on a particular matter will normally
be permitted to open and close the briefing."48 Thus, despite the
clear-cut requirements of the local rule requiring court approval for
the filing of a reply, and the defendant's failure to confer, Judge Fitz-
water permitted the reply to be filed49 and concluded that it "should
38. Id.
39. I& at 291.
40. Id
41. Id,
42. Id. at 286 n.4.
43. Id. at 291.
44. Id,
45. Id.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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... be rare that a party who opposes a motion will object to the mo-
vant's filing a reply."50
B. What Dondi Means to the Bar
1. The Court Posits the "Problem"
The holdings in Dondi Properties and Knight were said by the en
banc panel of the court to be made in accordance with certain stan-
dards of conduct the court adopted in a pseudo-legislative move in
the beginning of its opinion.51 Despite the fact that the judicial
branch is "charged with the responsibility for deciding cases and con-
troversies and for administering justice,"52 the panel was determined
to deal with "a problem that, though of relatively recent origin, is so
pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of justice and
to place litigation beyond the financial reach of litigants."53
The problem identified by the court is the "unnecessary contention
and sharp practices between lawyers." 54 According to the court,
judges and magistrates are asked "with alarming frequency" to
"devote substantial attention to refereeing abusive litigation tactics
that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction."55 The
court also noted that those matters "do not advance the resolution of
the merits of the case" and do not promote justice because "the costs
of litigation are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being
prohibitive. "56
Yet, despite its length, the Dondi opinion does not delineate the lit-
igation tactics it viewed as unnecessarily contentious, sharp, or abu-
sive. Rather, the court noted:
As judges and former practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of ex-
perience, we judicially know that litigation was conducted today in a manner
far different from years past. Whether the increased size of the bar has de-
creased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, where
experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be ob-
served, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe pat-
terns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice.5 7
50. Id. at 291-92.
51. Id. at 286.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
2. The Court Legislates a "Solution"
Despite its failure to delineate specifically the behavior which it
identified as the "problem," the court adopted a detailed "solution" in
the form of a Code of Professional Courtesy.58 The court found the
Dallas Bar Association's recently adopted Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy and Lawyer's Creed to be "both sensible and pertinent to
the problems" at hand.59 In tandem with failing to explain why the
rules were sensible, the court provided no reasoning to suggest how
the new standards would alleviate the problems identified. 60 Never-
theless, the court concluded that every attorney appearing in civil ac-
tions in the Northern District of Texas must observe the following:61
* Lawyers owe both a "primary duty to the client" and a "broader duty to
the judicial system that serves both attorney and client";
* A lawyer owes a duty to opposing counsel to be courteous and to
"cooperate";
* Lawyers "shall always treat adverse witnesses ... with fairness and due
consideration";
" Lawyers "should not use any form of discovery, or the scheduling of dis-
covery" to "harass opposing counsel or their client";
" Lawyers "will not arbitrarily or unreasonably withhold consent" to a "just
request for cooperation ... or scheduling accommodation"; and
• "[Miembers of the Bar will adhere to a higher standard of conduct which
judges, lawyers, clients and the public may rightfully expect," and will rec-
ognize that "[e]ffective advocacy does not require antagonistic or obnoxious
behavior ... ."62
Unfortunately, the court did not provide any specific content or
definition for words and phrases such as courtesy, civility, or obnox-
ious behavior. Although the court emphasized that it did not "invite
satellite litigation" similar to Rule 11, it stressed that "malfeasant
counsel can expect that their conduct will prompt an appropriate re-
sponse from the court, including the range of sanctions the Fifth Cir-
cuit suggests in a Rule 11 context."6 3 Thus, the court warned "those
litigators who persist in viewing themselves solely as combatants, or
who perceive that they are retained to win at all costs without regard
to fundamental principles of justice" that they "will find that their
conduct does not square with the practices we expect of them."64
58. Id at 287; see also, Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics
Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 637 (1990).
59. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 288. The Fifth Circuit has suggested a range of sanctions under Rule 11:
"a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, com-
pulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the cir-
cumstances." Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 288.
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III. QUESTIONING THE PREMISE: IS THERE A CIVILITY CRISIS?
Dondi stems from the assumption that many of the problems fac-
ing our courts are caused by the emergence of a civility crisis at the
bar. Such an assumption has been fostered by a number of commen-
tators who have written about "Rambo" or "hardball" litigation tac-
tics.65 Unfortunately, like the court in Dondi, many of the
commentators simply have assumed that "the level of civility among
lawyers is not what it should be .... 66 In addition, they assume that
the lack of civility increases the costs of litigation, over-crowds dock-
ets, and denigrates our profession's esteem in society.6 7 In this sec-
tion, we examine these assumptions and conclude that they are by no
means without doubt.
A. Are Lawyers Truly Less Civil Today?
Despite the recent spark of interest, there is no real proof that the
bar is any less civil today than it was in the past. In fact, every gen-
eration of lawyers seems to delight in taking up the cudgels against
incivility. For example, the Albany Law Journal wrote of the Bad
Lawyers in 1887-ninety-nine years before Dondi.68 And in 1904, an
65. See, e.g., id, at 286 ("Our system of justice can ill-afford to devote scarce re-
sources to supervising matters that do not advance the resolution of the merits of a
case; nor can justice long remain available to deserving litigants if the costs of litiga-
tion are fueled unnecessarily to the point of being prohibitive.").
66. See New York Code, supra note 2, at 739. The Committee Report acknowl-
edges that "some will challenge" the conclusion that civility among lawyers has de-
clined. . However, other commentators, and the Dondi opinion itself, simply assume
that the profession is in a state of crisis. See, e.g., Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286 ("As judges
and practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of experience, we judicially
know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far different from years past.");
Los ANGELES GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 1 ("Many believe that relations between
lawyers have so declined that our profession nears a crisis-one that not only impli-
cates how we deal with each other but threatens our usefulness to society, the ability
of our clients to bear the cost of our work and the essential values that mark us as
professionals."); Brown, supra note 2, at 55 (asking and briefly answering the question,
"What can be done with reason and practicality to salvage the traditional grace and
collegiality of the American bar?"); Sayler, supra note 2, at 79 ("Between spitball and
slow-pitch softball exists an approach to trial advocacy warranting urgent attention be-
cause it is pernicious and on the rise."); Miner, supra note 2, at 14 ("IThere is a civility
crisis of major proportions involving the bar.").
67. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 288 ("Effective Advocacy does not require antagonistic or
obnoxious behavior and members of the Bar will adhere to the higher standard of con-
duct which.., the public may rightfully expect.").
68. See The Argonaut, The Bad Lawyers, 36 ALB. L.J. 140 (1887). What was a "Bad
Lawyer" ninety-nine years ago? Apparently, he was a lot like today's "Rambo"
litigator:
Once at the bar, he makes his way by bluster and cheek. What he lacks in
article entitled Some Types of Lawyers complained of the intimida-
tion practices of bluffers.69 Indeed, the literature over the past 100
years is replete with complaints by older, more "seasoned" members
of the bar about the manner in which their younger, more aggressive
adversaries are upsetting the apple cart.70 That is not surprising, be-
cause our adversary system necessarily pits lawyer against lawyer in
a win or lose dialectic before a panel of our peers.71
B. Is Law Becoming Less of a Profession and More of a Business?
The concern that the law has become a business, rather than a pro-
fession, also has plagued our predecessors. Lawyers in ancient Rome
and Egypt suffered this criticism.7 2 Almost eighty years ago, in 1912,
an article in the Yale Law Journal bemoaned that:
It is an easy matter for a young lawyer who starts out with the pursuit of law
as a practice rather than a profession, who has always in mind fees and money
as a first consideration, to slip into bad practices and little by little develop
into a genuine shyster.7
3
In 1906, another article complained that: "Eminent and well-es-
teemed counsel . . . unhesitatingly point out certain prevailing ten-
dencies [in the bar] which they regard as detrimental." 74  The
tendencies?
learning he makes up in impudence; if he lacks moral character, the law af-
fords him the opportunity to practice rascality; if he is personally dishonest,
he knows enough to hide his criminal practices; not only have the qualifica-
tion, learning, industry of students, and personal character of students been
lost sight of, but the whole moral plane of the profession has been depressed
till [sic] there is no crime so dreadful that it cannot find men at the bar will-
ing to consult in its perpetration. There is no crime so palpable, open and de-
fiant of law that there is not a struggle among the members of the profession
to defend the criminal. If there is money in a case, however notorious or bad,
how many attorneys are there at the bar of San Francisco who will not find
some excuse for accepting a retainer?
Id.
69. See Hopper, Some Types of Lawyers, 66 ALB. L.J. 51 (1904).
70. See, e.g., Sayler, supra note 2, at 79.
71. No one would call Abraham Lincoln a "Rambo" litigator by today's definition.
Yet, Lincoln reportedly provided the following advice to trial lawyers of his day:
"When you have the facts, pound the facts. When you have the law, pound the law.
When you have neither, pound the table."
72. See Davis, Lawyers vs. The Rest of Mankind, 58 ALB. L.J. 265 (1898) (noting
that "attack upon the advocate is not by any means modern... [and that], the ancient
Egyptians expressly forbade advocates to plead in their courts, on the grounds that
'they darkened the administration of the laws.' "); Hopper, Lawyers of Ancient Rome,
66 ALB. L.J. 248, 249 (1904) (discussing Roman lawyers and noting that the "legalizing
of fees was a sad blow to those who worshipped the old ideals, and complaint was
made that the profession had degenerated into a love of pelf [sic] and that persons of
the lower rank sometimes assumed the profession, and advocates made a shameful
trade of their function by fomenting lawsuits, and lived upon the spoils of their fellow
citizens").
73. Cockrill, The Shyster Lawyer, 21 YALE L.J. 383, 386 (1912).
74. Chamberlayne, The Soul of the Profession, GREEN BAG, June 1906, at 396.
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* The "basic evil of commercialism";7 5
* The "far too frequent opinion [that] it is the primary duty of a lawyer to be
'smart' 
-;76
* The absence of a feeling that the lawyer is "in any degree responsible that
the counterbalancing truth should be heard at all";7 7 and
• The pursuit of a client's goals while overlooking that the lawyer serves "as
an officer of the court" and shares "with the judge the responsibilities,
honors, and privileges of a ministrant at the shrine of justice."'7 8
However, there is no real evidence that recent changes in the bar
have caused an increase in commercialism or that commercialism
causes lawyers to be less civil today than in times past.79
C. Are Lawyers Any Less Loved Today?
It has become popular in some circles to suggest that, not only are
hardball litigators clogging our courthouses, they are engaging in con-
duct which holds the "profession" up to public scorn. However, there
is substantial evidence that lawyers have been and always will be in a
love/hate relationship with their clients and the public. Once again,
the literature is replete with attacks upon the scruples and esteem of
lawyers.0 Empirical studies also confirm that lawyers have suffered
low regard for quite some time.81
In addition, life in the information age may distort the magnitude
of our own declining sense of worth. As one lawyer noted in 1908
(well before the American Lawyer hit the streets):
In these days of perfecting (or is it perfection?) printing presses and other
mechanical agencies for the diffusion of ready-made intelligence, we may
think that attacks on lawyers are more numerous and more venomous than
ever before. But that is not the case. So far as the number of attacks is con-
75. ILd. at 396; cf Platt, The Decadence of Law as a Profession and Its Growth as a
Business, 12 YALE L.J. 441, 441 (1903) (stating that for "nearly a decade... the legal
profession has been searching for an adequate explanation and understanding of why
the volume of legal business grew steadily less for the individual practitioner despite
the rapid and healthy upward movement in all classes of commercial pursuits").
76. Chamberlayne, supra note 74, at 398.
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id. at 400.
79. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 (1985) (noting that "[a]ll persons in-
volved in the judicial process-judges, litigants, witnesses, and court officers-owe a
duty of courtesy to all other participants"). Contra Reavley, supra note 58, at 643-46.
80. See Denovan, The Lawyers of Dickens, 5 CANADIAN L. REV. 296, 297 (1906).
From the days of Chaucer, [lawyers] were a favorite subject of satire. The
literature of the Commonwealth is peculiarly rich in this, and points to almost
a universal belief that wearers of the ermine and gentlemen of the long robe
would practice any sort of fraud or extortion for the sake of personal
advantage.
Id
81. See, e.g., Bradway, A National Bar Survey, 16 B.U.L. REV. 662 (1936).
cerned, we must remember that the New York Journal, for instance, reaches
more people than were reached in the olden days by the town crier or the vil-
lage scold. As to the malignity of the present-day attacks, we may rest as-
sured that lawyers were long ago accused of every misdeed known at the time;
and from what sacred and profane writings tell us of the tricks and manners
of the ancients, we may comfort ourselves with the assurance that it would
puzzle the ingenuity of moderns to invent crimes more unlovely than those
known in the "good old days."
8 2
D. When Were the Good 01' Days, Anyway?
It may then be that the profession is no more at a crisis point of
incivility or commercialism today than 100 or 1000 years ago. Cer-
tainly, the notion deserves more proof than the "judicial knowledge"
of the courts, as in Dondi,83 or the reminiscences of the establish-
ment bar. Indeed, the following quote from a 1906 article entitled
The Imaginary Decadence of the Modern Bar could have been writ-
ten today:
We hear much nowadays from mournful critics who lament the decadence,
the corruption, the commercialism of the modern bar, and long for a return of
the good old days when all judges were honest, and all lawyers were simple
but learned folk, free from guile, bent only on guiding the faltering steps of
their fellow men along the rugged path of lawful living.
But when were those good old days?8 4
IV. QUESTIONING THE SOLUTION: Do COURTESY CODES HELP?
The Dondi court and the several bar associations that have promul-
gated codes of courtesy have justified having done so in the belief
that they would: (a) decrease the cost of litigation;8 5 (b) alleviate
crowded dockets;86 and (c) increase the esteem of lawyers in soci-
ety.8 7 But are courtesy codes an appropriate response to these al-
leged problems? In this section, we explain why we think they are
not.
A. Remedies Already Exist for Curbing Litigation Abuses
Courtesy codes are adopted to curb litigation excesses and thereby
control the costs of bringing or defending claims. But numerous
82. Myers, The Damnation of the Modern Bar, 12 L. NoTES 48.(1908).
83. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284,
286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc).
84. J.C.M., The Imaginary Decadence of the Modern Bar, 9 L. NoTES 211 (1906);
see Vance, Is the Legal Profession Losing its Influence in the Community?, 91 CENT.
L.J. 77 (1920) (taking "little stock in the talk that we so often hear to the effect that
the lawyers of this day do not occupy the position in the community which they had in
the good old days of the heroic or that judges are not now honored in the same man-
ner as they were in the days past").
85. See Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286 (stating that "justice delayed, and justice obtained
at excessive cost, is often justice denied").
86. Id.
87. New York Code, supra note 2 at 739.
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channels already exist to accomplish that goal. As Dondi recognized,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the United States Code al-
ready provide the court and opposing parties with remedies for im-
proper or abusive discovery tactics.8 8 Abuses can also be curbed by
shifting attorneys' fees to the losing party-a rule which, in Texas at
least, applies to all contract actions and therefore many of the com-
mercial disputes which gave rise to the Dondi opinion.8 9
Abuses also can be controlled by litigating the "Rambo" issue
before the jury.90 In most jurisdictions, a litigant must show that his
fees are reasonable.9 1 Proof of this element can--and should-in-
volve the need to resort to so-called "hardball" tactics.
If, in fact, a party has taken his abusive tactics from the boardroom
to the courtroom, that accusation can be established in court and it-
self presents an inference that the claims have merit. If, on the other
hand, a jury cannot be convinced that the tactics were unreasonable,
they do not raise the problems cited by Dondi and the commentators
and should not be the subject of a Dondi-like solution.
B. Hardball Tactics Will Stop If They Are Not Fffective
Representation
There is no proof that "Rambo" litigators delay their cases or un-
88. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (empowering court with the ability to tax attorneys
with costs and attorney's fees resulting from unreasonable and vexatious multiplica-
tion of proceedings); FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (granting court the power to impose sanctions
upon parties who sign pleadings, motions, or other documents, the purpose of which is
to "harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation");
id. at 37 (authorizing sanctions for attorneys and represented parties in violation of
court rules and orders).
89. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986) (providing for
"recovery of reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or corporation, in addition
to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for ... an oral or written
contract").
90. See Nguyen Ngoc Giao v. Smith & Lamm, P.C., 714 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986), which states:
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees
include: (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the nature and complexities of
the case; (3) the amount of money or the value of the property or interest in-
volved; (4) the extent of the responsibilities assumed by the attorney; (5)
whether other employment is lost by the attorney because of the undertaking;
(6) the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (7) the contingency
or certainty of compensation; and (8) whether the employment is casual or for
an established or constant client.
Id, at 148-49.
91. See generally Annotation, Necessity of Introducing Evidence to Show Reasona-
bleness of Attorneys'Fees Where Promissory Note Provides for Such Fees, 18 A.L.R. 3D
733 (1968).
duly increase costs through unnecessary motions. To the contrary,
the modern day hardball, self-styled Rambo litigators push their
cases hard and pride themselves in doing so.92 The simple truth is
that hardball litigators recognize that commercial clients do not liti-
gate in a vacuum and generally want a result which is quick, certain,
and successful.93 These factors are not linear, and are balanced
against each other as the needs of each case and client dictate. The
factors also are balanced at numerous times in a lawsuit and may be
weighed differently depending upon the nature and style of the pro-
ceedings. In short, an effective commercial litigator already considers
the needs of his client and the burdens on the system when litigating
the case.94 Courtesy codes are therefore superfluous to effective
advocacy.
C The Codes of Courtesy Have Not Had Any Apparent Fffect
Finally, the adoption of courtesy codes has not had any apparent
beneficial effect on trial dockets. The number of civil cases filed by
private citizens in federal courts has not declined over the past few
years.95 Nor does it appear that cases have been litigated with any
more speed; the median age of a case from commencement to resolu-
92. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 48-52. Monroe Freedman, a legal ethics profes-
sor at Hofstra, notes: "Hardball is playing with a baseball, not a softball;... [it] implies
a high level of professionalism . .. it doesn't mean spitball or sleazeball." Id. at 49.
Barry Montgomery, a personal injury trial attorney, notes: "A lot of people miscon-
strue hardball to mean we will do everything we can to keep the other side from get-
ting the information .... [w]e will obfuscate the facts, we will delay, we will make it
as costly as possible for the opposition. That's not hardball." Id. at 48. Lindsey
Lerman Miller agrees that "hardball" is played most often "not for sport but to give
the client "'a clear advantage.'" Id. at 50. Raoul Felder, of the firm Raoul L. Felder
in New York, says: "[Y]ou are obligated to go right to the limits of zealous advocacy for
your clients . . . hardball isn't bullying-it's a surgeon operating with a scalpel."
Goldberg & Hengstler, Hardball is..., A.B.A. J., July 1987, at 52. Gloria Allred says:
"Hardball means being ready, willing and able to do whatever can legally be done to
protect your client's rights-including preparation for trial." Id.
93. When a hardball litigator institutes a lawsuit for his client, he is ready to do
whatever legally can be done to pursue and protect the client's rights. See id. at 52
(citing Gloria Allred). If he operates within the rules, not agreeing to needless time
extensions 6r extra filings, he saves his client money. And when he uses "hardball"
tactics to jockey for position prior to trial, then he has put his client in the best posi-
tion to win at trial or to settle for a greater amount than he might otherwise. See id.
at 50 (Lindsey Lerman Miller speaking about giving her client "a clear advantage").
94. See Morgan, Duties of Bar and Bench, 5 L. NOTES 29, 31 (1901) (stating that
"codes of ethics are of little practical value .... To an upright lawyer they are unnec-
essary; and formal adoption of them, by way of a code, will not prevent their infraction
by a lawyer who is not upright.").
95. In 1987, private civil suits filed in the federal courts increased two percent,
from 162,998 to 166,960. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1987) [hereinafter 1987 REPORT]. The
same was true in 1988. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1988) [hereinafter 1988 REPORT].
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tion is eight months.96 Neither statistic is surprising. Many of the
rules of courtesy suggested by Dondi involve accommodations to law-
yers' schedules and conflicts.97 Thus, at best, the codes are neutral
and, at worst, actually promote delays in the resolution of cases. 98
The experience in the Northern District of Texas also supports this
conclusion. Although Dondi suggested that it did not invite satellite
motions, it has spawned a new type of satellite practice: making the
other side appear unreasonable. Time and money now is often spent
by lawyers in all types of cases in efforts to show that their adversa-
ries are taking technically correct but unfair and unreasonable posi-
tions. Thus, the imposed requirement of civility often raises the
stakes yet another notch-with no apparent effect on the docket or
the number of motions which need resolution.
V. QUESTIONING THE SOLUTION: Do COURTESY CODES ACTUALLY
HURT THE PROFESSION?
A. The Codes Divert Our Attention From the Real Issues
Like any panacea, courtesy codes may actually hurt rather than
help efforts to decrease litigation costs, increase the speed in which
cases are resolved, and improve the stature of our profession.
Crowded dockets should be addressed through more judges, special-
ized courts for simple and complex cases, and other means-not the
policing of lawyers. Similarly, the spiraling costs of litigation should
be rectified by adoption of the English rule (loser pays fees) and
other mechanisms for making litigation more cost effective (such as
Alternative Dispute Resolution)-not rules which tie the hands of
96. In fact, in 1987, eleven percent fewer suits were terminated than the year
before. See 1987 REPORT, supra note 95. Moreover, although a rise in civil termina-
tions occurred in 1988, that year was "highlighted by increases in dispositions of asbes-
tos products liability cases and several social security disability insurance cases." 1988
REPORT, supra note 95. "The median time from filing to disposition, excluding land
condemnation cases, prisoner petitions, and deportation reviews, remained constant at
eight months from 1987 to 1988." Id,
97. For example, the Dondi court promoted agreements about extensions of time
for deadlines. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284, 294 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc) (excerpt from the Dallas Bar Association Guide-
lines of Professional Courtesy). It is hard to see how an obligation to agree will pro-
mote faster adjudication of cases, especially when a danger exists that the requested
party may be branded as uncooperative if he does not agree.
98. Indeed, under the guise of promoting courtesy and expedition of cases, the
Dondi court allowed a reply brief to stand that had been filed by the defendant with-
out the court's permission in admitted violation of two local rules of the court. None-
theless, the court ruled that the plaintiff had improperly failed to "cooperate" with
opposing counsel by moving to strike. Id, at 291-92.
counsel in the courtroom. Indeed, in our opinion, low public esteem
for lawyers stems primarily from a belief that lawyers are not re-
sponsive to the needs of their clients-not that they are too aggres-
sive on their clients' behalf. Thus, the bar should be more concerned
that its members engage in a careful analysis of crowded dockets, a
study of the pros and cons of the common-law system, and a honing
of their own skills as lawyers. In short, continuing legal education,
not civility, should be the focus of our profession.
B. The Codes Also Threaten the Role of the Advocate in our System
of Justice
The codes of courtesy also have a more subtle, but potentially dev-
astating, effect on the bar and the public. Our present code of ethics
requires lawyers to zealously represent the interests of their cli-
ents.9 9 That means that a lawyer must use every available means of
winning at his disposal.100 The obligation of zealous representation
[i]s the heart of the adversary process. Each attorney, as an advocate, asks for
and seeks that which in his judgment is best for his client, within the bounds
authoritatively established. The advocate does not decide what is just in this
case-he would be usurping the function of the judge and jury-he asks for
and seeks for his client that which he is entitled to under the law. He can do
no less and properly represent the client.1 0'
Thus, as Professor Dershowitz (a self-styled "hardball" trial lawyer)
has noted, if a lawyer is not prohibited by the canons of ethics from
utilizing a tactic or strategy, they require that he do so.' 0 2
The Dondi opinion and the anti-hardball commentaries threaten to
emasculate the single-minded purpose of the advocate and stall crea-
99. Ethical Canon 7-1 provides that:
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary
Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibil-
ity of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the
duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal
rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member
of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accord-
ance with the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible
means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981); see Schlosser v. Trapoli,
609 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (lawyer filed suit but had not taken any other
action in the three and a half years before the court's dismissal of the case).
100. This also was true almost 100 years ago. See Morgan, supra note 94, at 31.
In order to further or protect the interests of his client, counsel must resort to
legal tactics. He may consider it advisable to carry his client's cause into
court, even when he has no intention of forcing it to a trial. After the cause is
in court, he may adopt a course of action, with a view to coercing the adverse
party into a proper consideration of the subject of the controversy; in short he
must manage his case, and manage it according to his own best judgment.
Id.
101. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981); Penegar,
supra note 2, at 338.
102. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 48.
[Vol. 17: 833, 1990] One Year After Dondi
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tivity and effective advocacy.'0 3 If, as Dondi suggests, a "client has
no right to demand that counsel abuse the opposite party or indulge
in offensive conduct,"'10 4 is it permissible for an advocate to call a wit-
ness a "liar" (or even to imply that such is the case)? If, according to
Dondi, members of the bar must consent to a "just request for coop-
eration,"105 should a litigator agree not to press a valid motion be-
cause his colleague missed a filing deadline? Just how should a
lawyer accommodate the two "duties" identified in Dondi: is the
"broader" duty to the system as a whole a trump of the apparently
"narrower" duty to the client? And just what does that broader duty
"to the system" entail?
The answers to these questions, though clear under the codes of
ethics and the rules of procedure, become hopelessly vague and diffi-
cult to apply if "courtesy" to one's colleagues and the other litigants
is elevated to a duty.106 Certainly, the lawyers who brought Brown v.
Board of EducationlO7 were uninterested in the conventional "wis-
dom" that separate was equal and that the facts would prove that
point. Were the lawyers who used "Brandeis-briefs" to sustain the
validity of congressional delegations of power to administrative agen-
103. At least one commentator has openly admitted this possibility by noting that
"[s]cholars are not convinced that adversarial litigation yields a more pure form of jus-
tice than other dispute resolution methods." Sayler, supra note 2, at 80.
104. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 288
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc) (quoting The Dallas Bar Association's professional courtesy
guidelines).
105. Id.
106. The following passage reveals that there are no firm guidelines for the limits
of advocacy other than the lawyer's "judgment":
We must in some way train out of our young man the excessive combat spirit.
It is true that all legal procedure is, in a sense, a survival of the old ordeal of
trial by battle. Human ingenuity has never devised any other way. It is diffi-
cult to protect a client with a good case and a poor lawyer from the merciless
clutches of a capable lawyer with a poor case. There is no basic equality in
human capacities and we must continue to allow for these differences in abil-
ity. But we can stress among our members the necessity of rendering service
to the client and repressing the lawyer's individual love of a fight. Litigious
lawyers gratify their vanity by excessive displays of combativeness, but the cli-
ent seldom ever reaps any reward from the fray. A well trained lawyer, who
considers carefully his clients' rights, should be the slowest man on earth to
bring on a battle, the outcome of which, unless he is a fool or a knave, he
knows must be uncertain.
Simms, Speed in the Administration of Justice, 16 A.B.A. J. 290, 291 (1930); cf.
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 48. Don Reuben, chief counsel for the Chicago Tribune and
the Archdiocese of Chicago, notes, "[h]ardball is consistent with fair play .... It does
not mean being a jerk .... You don't litigate just to litigate. If you do you're a fool."
Id.
107. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
cies "Rambo" litigators? They were certainly "antagonistic" and, at
times, even "obnoxious" in pressing their cases. Is it appropriate to
attempt to curb these "tactics" through judicial mandates of
courtesy?
We do not think so. Litigation of complex commercial cases is
time-consuming because it is a battle of perspectives, not just of
"facts." The promissory note case presented by the bank is a joint
venture case by the "borrower." Questions of good faith and bad
faith over a long-term relationship are answered bit by bit, not in
one-hour depositions in which the questions are directly put and the
bad faith is openly admitted. In the end, as in every case, the jury is
asked to determine which version of events is more likely, not more
conformable to fact. The advocate should be able to work within
these restrictions without second-guessing or being second-guessed.
Thus, the ultimate problem with the courtesy codes is that they may
chill effective advocacy and make the law so uncertain that it is of no
use to the litigant. They should be abolished.
